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Abstract 
This contribution argues that the EU’s ‘cosmopolitan foreign policy constitution’ (e.g. based on Articles 
2,3 and 21 TEU and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) and the universal recognition of human 
rights require re-interpreting the ‘rules of recognition’ of EU and international law by ‘balancing’ state-
centered rules and principles with the human and constitutional rights of EU citizens and the person-
centered ‘principles of justice’ underlying EU constitutional law and multilevel human rights law. As 
EU law recognizes citizens as ‘agents of justice’, constituent powers and ‘democratic principals’ entitled 
to constitutional rights and ‘strict observance of international law’ (Article 3 TEU) also in the EU 
external relations, the transnational constitutional rights and multilevel judicial remedies protected by 
EU law must be construed as entitling citizens to transnational rule of law and corresponding duties of 
EU institutions to protect citizens and their rights also in international dispute settlement procedures 
(e.g. under UN, WTO, regional trade and investment agreements). The EU constitutional principles of 
conferral, subsidiarity, proportionality and access to justice for multilevel judicial protection of equal 
freedoms and ‘strict observance of international law’ are relevant context for interpreting EU obligations 
under UN, WTO and other treaty and dispute settlement systems for the benefit of EU citizens that must 
hold the limited ‘constituted powers’ of multilevel governance institutions more legally, democratically 
and judicially accountable in order to protect transnational public goods and rule of law inside the EU. 
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 1 
Introduction: individuals and international dispute settlement 
According to Article 2 TEU, the ‘Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights’. Hence, national and EU citizens are 
recognized in the EU as legal subjects, constituent powers and ‘democratic principals’ vis-à-vis all 
constituted, limited government powers. Also ‘in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall 
uphold and promote its values… and contribute to the protection of its citizens’ through, inter alia, 
‘strict observance and the development of international law’ in order to protect international public 
goods (PGs) as specified in Article 3 TEU. This emphasis on ‘freedom’ and multilevel protection of 
‘rule of law’ reflects the insight that equal freedoms of citizens - as ‘first principle of justice’ according 
to Kantian and Rawlsian constitutional theories - cannot remain effective inside democracies without 
multilevel constitutional protection of equal freedoms also in transnational and international human 
interactions; for instance, discriminatory import restrictions in violation of WTO rules are bound to 
discriminate also between domestic importers and consumers by distorting market access, prices and 
market shares. Hence, it is because ‘(t)he problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is 
subordinate to the problem of a law-governed external  relationship with other states, and cannot be 
solved unless the latter is also solved’1, that the ‘Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided 
by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks 
to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity’ 
(Article 21 TEU). Common market freedoms and the ‘liberty rights’ protected in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) permeate not only internal EU law. The EU’s customs union obligations 
under WTO law (e.g. Article XXIV) and EU law (Articles 30 ff TFEU), the corresponding transnational 
rights of citizens (e.g. the ‘freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union law’ pursuant to 
Article 16 EUCFR), and the constitutional commitments to ‘protection of its citizens’ and ‘free and fair 
trade’ in external relations (Articles 3 TEU) also protect freedom of EU citizens beyond EU borders, for 
instance by prohibiting discriminatory non-tariff trade barriers violating GATT/WTO obligations of the 
EU and its member states.   
Empirical evidence confirms that the successful internal development of the EU (e.g. its common market 
law) was largely due to its multilevel judicial protection of fundamental freedoms, rule of law and 
democratic governance. Also the EU’s 'foreign policy constitution' – as laid down, inter alia, in Articles 
2, 3, 21 TEU and in the EUCFR - requires multilevel judicial protection of equal freedoms, ‘strict 
observance of international law’ and democratic governance so as to realize the explicit EU objective 
'to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law … and … human rights and fundamental 
freedoms'.2 Just as constitutional theories of justice and EU law recognize citizens as ‘agents of justice’ 
whose ‘inalienable rights’ and ‘constitutional contracts’ constitute limited government powers based on 
principles of ‘conferral’, ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘proportionality’ (as recognized in Article 5 TEU), the 
universal recognition of human rights by all UN member states likewise requires interpreting 
international treaties and settling related disputes ‘in conformity with the principles of justice’, including 
also ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’, as explicitly recognized in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (cf. its Preamble and Article 31 VCLT).   
 
                                                     
1 I.Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, in: I. Kant’s Political Writings (ed. by H. Reiss, CUP 
1991), 41, at 47. 
2 Cf. E.U.Petersmann, The Foreign Policy Constitution of the European Union: A Kantian Perspective, in: Ulrich Immenga et 
alii (eds), Festschrift für Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996), 433 – 447; idem, Integrating Human 
Rights into EU Trade Relations – The EU as a Global Role Model? in: T.Takacs/A.Ott/A.Dimopoulos (eds), Linking Trade 
and Non-Commercial Interests: The EU as a Global Role Model? (CLEER Working Papers 2013/4), 15-26. 
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The EU participates in international dispute settlement proceedings mainly in the context of UN 
agreements (e.g. the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea), WTO agreements (the WTO dispute 
settlement system) and EU trade and investment agreements (e.g. third party intervention by the EU in 
investor-state arbitration). All these UN, WTO, trade and investment agreements are approved by 
national and European parliaments so as to protect transnational transactions (e.g. trade, investments, 
shipping) of EU citizens, for instance by providing ‘security and predictability to the multilateral trading 
system’ (Article 3 DSU), reducing private transaction costs, and protecting individual rights and market 
access in the global division of labor. The EU Trade Barriers Regulation offers legal procedures 
empowering EU citizens to request diplomatic and legal protection by the EU vis-à-vis ‘illicit trade 
barriers’ by third countries. A large part of the more than 600 complaints submitted by GATT/WTO 
members continues to be triggered indirectly by requests from industries on the basis of domestic legal 
safeguards, as reflected in the names of many GATT/WTO disputes (e.g. ‘Kodak/Fuji’, ‘Havana Club’, 
‘EU bananas’, 'Boeing/Airbus aircraft disputes', GMO disputes). More importantly, the ‘dispute 
settlement system of the WTO’ (Article 3 DSU) prescribes and protects judicial remedies also for 
individuals and non-governmental actors in domestic legal systems, for instance in the field of GATT 
(Article X), the WTO Antidumping Agreement (Article 13), the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation 
(Article 11), the Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection (Article 4), the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (Article 23), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (Article VI GATS), 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (Articles 41-50, 59 TRIPS) and the 
Agreement on Government Procurement (Article XX). Violations of international trade, investment, 
transport and communication rules often affect the equal freedoms and welfare of EU citizens – for 
instance, their ‘freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union law and national laws’ (Article 
16 EUCFR) and their ‘right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired 
possessions’ (Article 17 EUCFR). Hence, judicial protection of ‘consistent interpretations’ of multilevel 
economic regulations and individual rights to invoke in domestic courts international rules protecting 
equal freedoms, non-discrimination and rule of law have been among the most successful EU principles 
for promoting rule of law inside and beyond the EU. Inside the European Economic Area (EEA) and in 
other EU free trade agreements (FTAs), the ‘direct applicability’ of free trade rules entailed that 
international trade disputes among states have rarely arisen in the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) and 
EFTA Court due to their avoidance through decentralized, de-politicized rule-enforcement by self-
interested citizens. ‘Direct applicability’ of WTO rules in domestic legal systems (as required by Article 
XX of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement), ‘consistent interpretation’ of WTO rules, or 
their ‘indirect applicability’ by domestic courts (as required by the above-mentioned WTO guarantees 
of judicial remedies and by Article XIV:4 WTO Agreement on good faith-implementation of WTO 
obligations) could similarly promote decentralized implementation of WTO rules by economic operators 
and domestic institutions, thereby preventing and de-politicizing power-oriented dispute settlement 
proceeding with third WTO members.3 More importantly, rights-based participation of citizens in 
providing PGs also promotes ‘participatory’ and ‘deliberative democracy’ and ‘republican virtues’; by 
empowering citizens to challenge abuses of public and private powers, it helps to ‘constitutionalize’ and 
‘socialize’ law, e.g. by empowering citizens as ‘republican guardians’ to transform the ‘constitutional 
law in the books’ into ‘law in action’ and social reality. 
If Articles 2, 3, 21 TEU and the EUCFR justify legal presumptions that EU citizens are entitled to 
protection of their equal freedoms through ‘strict observance of international law’, including 
international dispute settlement (= IDS) obligations of the EU and judicial remedies of ‘everyone’ 
(Article 47 EUCFR) against violations of individual rights: Can it be justified that EU institutions assert 
freedoms to violate international treaty and dispute settlement obligations which national and European 
parliaments approved for the benefit of EU citizens without conferring any powers on EU institutions 
to ignore ‘strict observance of international law’? The more UN and WTO institutions cooperate with 
                                                     
3 Cf. E.U.Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, London: Kluwer 1997, at 233 ff; C.Heidfeld, Die 
denzentrale Durchsetzung des WTO-Rechts in der EU, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2012.  
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non-governmental organizations (NGOs), national parliamentarians, business, the media and civil 
society in multilevel governance of PGs because UN and WTO ‘decisions affect the lives of ordinary 
men and women all over the world’4 and collective protection of global PGs depends on ‘public-private 
partnerships’ and on governmental cooperation with ‘intermediaries’ (e.g. based on limited delegation 
of powers, co-optation and ‘orchestration’ of joint projects): Can it be justified that EU trade politicians, 
since 2006, systematically exclude individual rights and effective judicial remedies of citizens also in 
FTAs concluded by the EU?   
Why does the EU fail to protect individual rights in the multilevel WTO dispute 
settlement system?  
The illegal EU import restrictions on bananas from 1992-2012 - in spite of 15 GATT and WTO dispute 
settlement findings confirming their inconsistency with the GATT/WTO legal obligations of the EU -, 
like the continuing EU import restrictions on biotech products and hormone-fed beef in violation of 
repeated WTO dispute settlement findings, illustrate the political weakness of EU institutions violating 
their international and EU obligations of 'strict observance of international law' in response to interest-
group pressures for illegal 'protection rents' (e.g. annually about 5 billion dollars due to price increases 
for bananas) and for disregard for science-based risk-assessment obligations (e.g. for GMOs and growth 
hormones for beef). The EU's return to WTO-consistent banana trading policies by the end of 2012 
further confirmed that such trade-distorting, illegal restrictions of EU traders and consumers were 
neither consistent with 'the principle of proportionality' (Article 5 TEU) nor 'necessary … to protect the 
rights and freedoms of others' (Article 52 EUCFR). In the more than 60 complaints by adversely affected 
EU traders seeking judicial remedies in national courts and in the EU Court (CJEU) against the illegal 
banana trade restrictions and their redistribution of market shares and 'protection rents' for the benefit of 
EU importers of bananas from former colonies of some EU member states, the CJEU accepted the EU 
Commission's claim of 'freedom of maneuver'5 to violate international treaty obligations; the CJEU also 
denies judicial remedies for third EU citizens if they were adversely affected by lawful reprisals from 
WTO trading partners and requested compensation for the injury caused to EU 'violation victims' and 
'retaliation victims' in response to arbitrary EU violations of WTO obligations.6 The CJEU extended its 
refusal to review the legality of EU acts in the light of the EU's WTO obligations also to other 
multilateral treaty and dispute settlement obligations of the EU (e.g. under the Law of the Sea 
Convention and the International Civil Aviation Organization), thereby confirming the increasing 
reluctance by the CJEU vis-à-vis accepting the jurisdiction of other international courts as legal 
limitation on the jurisprudence of the CJEU.7  
                                                     
4 WTO Director-General M. Moore in his opening speech to the first ‘Public Forum’ inside the WTO, which continues to be 
annually organized in the WTO since 2001 with participation of thousands of civil society representatives and NGOs; cf. 
The WTO at 20: Challenges and Achievements, WTO Geneva : 2015, at 81.  
5 The term ‘freedom of manoeuvre’ continues to be used by both the political EU institutions and the CJEU (e.g. in Joined 
cases C-120 and C-121/06 P, FIAMM, ECR 2008 I-6513, para. 119) as the main justification for their disregard of legally 
binding UN conventions, WTO rules and WTO dispute settlement rulings. The most recent CJEU judgment (Case C-21/14 
P Rusal, judgment of 16 July 2015) justifies 'the settled case-law of the Court that, given their nature and purpose, those 
(WTO) agreements are not in principle among the rules in the light of which the Court is to review the legality of measures 
adopted by the EU institutions'  also by the 'lack of reciprocity' by the EU's most important trading partners (paras. 38-39). 
6 On the CJEU jurisprudence (e.g. in the FIAMM case, note 5) denying individual rights (e.g. of ‘violation victims’) to invoke 
WTO rules in national and EU courts subject to the limited ‘Nakajima/ Fediol exceptions’ (based on the ‘implementation 
principle’) that have only very rarely been applied, and on the judicial denial of claims (e.g. by ‘retaliation victims’) to 
compensation even in case of severe damage caused by EU breaches of WTO obligations, see: A.Thies, International Trade 
Disputes and EU Liability (CUP 2013).  
7 Cf. B. de Witte, A Selfish Court ? The Court of Justice and the Design of International Dispute Settlement Beyond the 
European Union, in : M.Cremona/A.Thies (eds), The European Court of Justice and External Relations Law. Constitutional 
Challenges, Oxford : Hart 2014, 33-46. 
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Past arguments invented by EU politicians for justifying their non-compliance with GATT/WTO legal 
and dispute settlement obligations and for preventing citizens from invoking GATT/WTO rules in 
domestic courts - such as the alleged indeterminacy of GATT obligations, the existence of GATT 
safeguard clauses, the reciprocity of trade liberalization in GATT, and the political possibility of 
avoiding trade sanctions by third countries through voluntarily agreed compensation – lacked any 
convincing legal reasoning8; they have been progressively abandoned in favor of political claims by EU 
institutions that the ‘nature and purpose of WTO law’ justify ‘freedom of maneuver’ to violate WTO 
rules. Yet, such claims are inconsistent with 
 the unconditional GATT/WTO obligations to terminate illegal measures (e.g. as specified in the 
customary rules on state responsibility and enforced through the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding = DSU); 
 the lack of conferral of EU powers to engage in welfare-reducing violations of WTO rules which 
all national parliaments and the European Parliament approved for the benefit of EU citizens so 
as to protect rule of law inside and beyond the EU;  
 the legal primacy of international agreements concluded by the EU - as 'integral' and 'integrating 
parts'9 of the EU legal system - over other 'secondary EU law'; 
 the often precise and unconditional nature of WTO guarantees of freedom of trade, non-
discrimination and rule of law; and  
 the multilevel ‘nature and purpose’ of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system, as illustrated 
by the explicit GATT/WTO legal obligations to protect legal and judicial remedies against 
GATT/WTO violations also in domestic jurisdictions in order to provide ‘security and 
predictability’ for traders.10 
The GATT/WTO jurisprudence of the CJEU further disregards  
 the ‘constitutional mandate’ of EU courts (e.g. as specified in Articles 19, 21 TEU) to ‘ensure that 
in the implementation and application of the Treaties the law is observed’ so as to ‘ensure effective 
legal protection’ in the EU’s participation in multilevel governance of international PGs like a 
rules-based world trading system; and  
 the ‘democratic’ and ‘republican functions’ of international ‘PGs treaties’, which – the more 
globalization transforms national into global PGs that can be collectively supplied only through 
international treaties and their coherent domestic implementation – take over some  of the 
functions of democratic legislation so as to protect 'aggregate PGs' for the benefit of citizens, e.g. 
by requiring '(e)ach Member (to) ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative 
procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements' (Article XVI:4 WTO 
Agreement).  
As, according to the settled case-law of the CJEU, 'the principle of proportionality requires that acts of 
the EU institutions be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at 
issue and do not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives'11, EU compliance 
with WTO guarantees of equal freedoms, non-discriminatory trade conditions and 'strict observance of 
international law' in mutually beneficial trade transactions offers more efficient, lawful policy 
                                                     
8 Cf. E.U.Petersmann, Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, in: CMLR 20 (1983), 397 
– 437. 
9 This legal term for the 'domestic law effects' of international agreements concluded by the then European Community was 
coined by the CJEU in its Case 181/73, Haegeman v Belgium, ECR 1974, 449. 
10 Cf. Cf. E.U.Petersmann, Why Do the EU and its Court of Justice Fail to Protect the ‘Strict Observance of International Law’ 
(Article 3 TEU) in the World Trading System and in other Areas of Multilevel Governance of International Public Goods? 
in: European Yearbook of International Economic Law – Liber Amicorum for Horst G. Krenzler, Heidelberg: Springer 
2015, 145-189.  
11 Cf. Kokopelli, C-59/11, EU:C:2012, 447, and the case-law cited in para. 38. 
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instruments than discriminatory, welfare-reducing and illegal EU trade distortions in violation of WTO 
rules. At least in the trade policy area, EU constitutional law and the large ‘policy space’ reserved to the 
EU and EU member states by their WTO obligations exclude ‘political question justifications’ of EU 
violations of WTO law that undermine the international ‘aggregate PG’ of a rules-based world trading 
and dispute settlement system to the detriment of EU citizens. 
The fact that, since 2006, the political EU institutions systematically aim at limiting rights and judicial 
remedies of EU citizens also under FTAs12 confirms the broader political agenda behind the 'legal 
disempowerment' of EU citizens in EU external relations. The additional fact that the European 
Parliament apparently never discussed this systemic exclusion of rights and judicial remedies of EU 
citizens under FTAs and other ‘PGs treaties’ illustrates the ineffectiveness of parliamentary control and 
defense of citizen interests in the trade policy area. Contrary to the claims by EU institutions, the 'nature 
and purpose' of WTO rules requires ‘providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading 
system’ (Article 3 DSU) and individual access to justice for private economic actors that are adversely 
affected by illegal EU disregard for WTO law and dispute settlement rulings. When the GATT 
Secretariat hired me in 1981 as the first ‘legal officer’ ever employed by GATT, I was told that the 
GATT Director-Generals had so far not dared to establish a ‘GATT Office of Legal Affairs’ due to the 
opposition from the EC and its preference for political (i.e. power-oriented) rather than judicial 
settlement of the many GATT challenges of EC restrictions/distortions in agricultural trade. In the early 
1980s, lawyers from the EC Legal Services were not allowed to participate in GATT panel procedures; 
and EC Trade Commissioner Willy de Clerq continued to give speeches that ‘GATT must never be 
transformed into a trade court’. Even after the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations 
on the WTO and its DSU establishing a worldwide, compulsory jurisdiction for the settlement of WTO 
disputes, the EC Council Decision of 22 December 1994 on the conclusion of the WTO agreements 
claimed that ‘by its nature, the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, including the 
Annexes thereto, is not susceptible to being directly invoked in Community or Member State courts’.13 
Just as, during the 1980s, EU trade politicians responded to industry pressures by concluding dozens of 
secretive 'voluntary export restraint agreements' in violation of GATT and EU law, the 20 years (1991-
2012) of illegal EU import restrictions on bananas reflected unwillingness of EU trade politicians – as 
inside a 'banana republic' - to defend the rule-of-law vis-à-vis rent-seeking pressure groups. Other 
persistent violations of EU law - e.g. of the budget and debt disciplines imposed by Article 126 TFEU 
for the European Economic and Monetary Union, or of the 'Schengen procedures' for foreign asylum 
seekers and economic migrants – reveal systemic rule-of-law problems of periodically elected 
politicians inside the EU: the more the EU 'law in the books' is persistently violated, the weaker political 
institutions become (e.g. due to their ‘capture’ by rent-seeking interest groups they have to satisfy to 
secure majority support), and the more EU citizens complain about the ‘democratic deficit’ of illegal 
EU actions that ignore the rules adopted by national and European parliaments for the benefit of 
citizens.14 
 
                                                     
12 Cf. A.Semertzi, The Preclusion of Direct Effect in the Recently Concluded EU Free Trade Agreements, in: CMLRev 51 
(2014), 1125-1158. 
13 Cf. Petersmann (note 2), at 21. 
14 Cf. J.Zalc, Overcoming Democratic Breakdown in the EU, Fondation Robert Schuman, European Issues No 333 of 18 
November 2014, at 1: according to the ‘Euro-barometer’ statistics, confidence of EU citizens in the EU was at its lowest 
ebb in 2014, the distance between EU institutions and EU citizens having continuously widened, as illustrated by the low 
turnout and participation by citizens in the 2014 elections of the European Parliament: ‘citizens believe that their voices 
are not taken into account by the EU, which they consider to be removed from their concerns and lacking in transparency’. 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann 
6 
Why does the EU not comply with its constitutional requirement to protect citizens in 
IDS? 
Similar to the definition of 'constitutional democracies' by their protection of human and fundamental 
rights, rule of law and democratic governance, the explicit extension of this 'constitutional trias' to the 
EU's external actions (e.g. in Articles 3 and 21 TEU, the EUCFR) can be construed as a 'foreign policy 
constitution' of the EU that is supplemented by additional constitutional limitations of EU foreign policy 
powers, for instance 
 in the national and EU legal systems (e.g. the principles of conferral, subsidiarity, proportionality, 
human rights and 'the constitutional traditions common to the Member States' as 'general principles 
of the Union's law' pursuant to Articles 5 and 6 TEU); and also  
 in international law in view of the EU obligations under UN, WTO and regional law to protect 
equal freedoms, rule of law and other international PGs beyond states, with legal primacy of such 
international law obligations - as 'integral part' of the EU legal system - over unilateral EU 
secondary legislation.  
The deliberate non-conferral of EU powers to violate international treaties protecting international PGs 
reflects the insight that ‘strict observance of international law’ (Article 3 TEU) is a necessary policy 
objective for protecting ‘aggregate PGs’ inside and beyond the EU.15 The lack of an EU mandate to 
violate EU agreements (e.g. the WTO Agreement) ratified by national and EU parliaments for the benefit 
of citizens also follows from the principle of proportionality, according to which ‘the content and form 
of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties’ (Article 5:4 
TEU). Just as 
 the EU's multilevel legal protection of human rights in its external relations (e.g. by including 
'human rights clauses’ into more than 130 trade and co-operation agreements with third countries) 
strengthens civil society struggles for human rights and rule of law in transnational relations, and 
 the multilevel judicial protection of human rights and rule of law - e.g. by means of the Kadi-
jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ‘solange-jurisprudence’ of national constitutional courts and 
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) - limits power politics by 'cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism',  
 so can multilevel judicial co-operation in IDS protect equal rights of EU citizens to ‘strict 
observance of international law’ within a framework of 'republican constitutionalism' limiting EU 
violations of international treaties protecting PGs demanded by citizens and their democratic 
intitutions. 
EU constitutional safeguards of individual freedoms do not depend on reciprocity 
EU constitutional guarantees to ‘everyone’ of ‘an effective remedy before a tribunal’ are not conditioned 
on reciprocity (cf. Article 47 EUCFR). Human rights law (HRL) and European constitutional law 
provide that '(a)ny limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by this Charter must 
be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms' subject to constitutional 
safeguards of 'necessity' and 'proportionality' (Article 52 EUCFR). This constitutional justification must 
be respected by national and EU institutions also in the external relations law of the EU whenever 
individual freedoms - like the economic freedoms 'to choose an occupation' (Article 15), 'to conduct a 
business in accordance with Union law' (Article 16), and to own and use private property (Article 17 
EUCFR) - are protected by EU constitutional law across national and EU frontiers. In a multilevel rule 
of law community with constitutionally limited powers committed to 'protection of its citizens' and 'strict 
                                                     
15 Cf. note 1 and the related text and Article 5:2 TEU: ‘under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the 
limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. 
Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the member States’. 
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observance of international law' also in the EU's external relations (Article 3 TEU), the 'consistent 
interpretation' requirements of EU law and international law require national and EU courts to protect 
transnational rights of citizens with due regard to IDS rulings binding on the EU and its member states, 
as recognized in the jurisprudence of national Constitutional Courts requiring interpretation of 
fundamental rights with due regard to their interpretation and protection by the CJEU and by the 
ECtHR.16 The shared legal obligations and 'constitutional functions' of national, EU and international 
dispute settlement bodies to interpret treaties and settle related disputes 'in conformity with the principles 
of justice and international law', including also 'universal respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all' (Preamble and Article 31 VCLT), require multilevel judicial comity in their common 
mission of administrating justice, including ‘individual justice’ for citizens participating in mutually 
beneficial transnational cooperation and protection of PGs. EU law requires balancing state-centered 
and person-oriented 'principles of justice' with due respect for 'due process of law' guarantees and 
judicial remedies also in the EU's external relations so as to 'support democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights' and 'consistency' between its internal and external actions, as required by Article 21 TEU and by 
its call to protect civil society cooperation and democratic self-government among free and equal 
citizens beyond national frontiers, notably in the global division of labor and in related ‘compliance 
communities’ benefitting from transnational rule of law. As 
 EU citizens and national ‘peoples’ remain the ‘constituent powers’ and ‘democratic principals’ in 
the EU,  
 the European Parliament exercises only limited legislative, budgetary and political powers (cf. 
Article 14 TEU), and  
 ‘the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and 
solidarity’, ‘the principles of democracy and the rule of law’, and ‘places the individual at the heart 
of its activities’ (Preamble EUCFR), 
‘constitutional' and ‘cosmopolitan interpretations’ of EU law ‘fit better’ its multilevel constitutional 
structures than statist, power-oriented paradigms of foreign politics. The policy argument by EU trade 
diplomats - i.e. that they exclude individual rights to invoke FTA provisions and WTO legal obligations 
in domestic courts in view of the similar practices in the EU's trading partners like Canada, Singapore 
and the USA - are inconsistent with the EU's 'foreign policy constitution', just as EU denial of protection 
of human rights and labor rights in the context of FTAs cannot be justified on the ground that foreign 
trading partners (like the USA) have not ratified many UN human rights and ILO labor rights 
conventions that were ratified by EU member states.    
The EU must protect equal freedoms, rule of law and effective judicial remedies also in IDS 
Article 2 TEU and the EUCFR prioritize human dignity and equal freedoms as foundational values of 
the EU. EU constitutional law – and also its rule-of-law requirements - can be construed in conformity 
with liberal constitutional theories (e.g. from Kant to Rawls) as protecting equal freedoms as ‘first 
principle of justice’; limitations of the rights to dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, citizen rights and 
rights to access to justice protected by the EUCFR ‘may be made only if they are necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights 
and freedoms of others’ (Article 52 EUCFR). Hence, '(e)veryone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed 
by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal’ (Article 47 
EUCFR). Also the institutional guarantees in Article 19 TEU – i.e. the 'Court of Justice of the European 
Union …shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed… 
Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered 
by Union law' – must serve the equal freedoms and other rights of citizens as the ‘democratic principals’ 
of all EU institutions. Citizens – not EU trade diplomats - are ‘agents of justice’ and ‘democratic 
                                                     
16 Cf. the judgment by the German Constitutional Court in Görgülü v Germany (2004) 2 BvR 1481/04. 
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principals’ of EU law and the main economic actors and beneficiaries of the WTO trading and legal 
system; they should be recognized by EU institutions also as being entitled to ‘strict observance of 
international law’ and of IDS rulings protecting transnational rule of law in the collective supply of PGs 
for the benefit of citizens. The republican history of European democracies teaches that PGs (res 
publica) depend on empowerment of citizens to participate in the collective supply of PGs, for instance 
by holding government agents accountable for illegal interferences into ‘negative’ and ‘positive 
freedoms’ of citizens so as to prevent arbitrary domination.   
Article 3 TEU – by stating that the ‘Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of 
its peoples’ and specifying these objectives by a list of PGs (like the internal market, the ‘area of 
freedom, security and justice’, a ‘highly competitive social market economy’, an economic and 
monetary Union) – reflects the republican nature of EU law, i.e. the conferral by citizens and peoples of 
limited powers to EU institutions in order to protect PGs beneficial for all EU citizens. Articles 3 and 
21 TEU explicitly commit the EU to ‘republican constitutionalism’ (e.g. ‘democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms’ and other specific PGs) also in its external relations. Similarly, 
the EU’s specific foreign policy mandates emphasize the need for respecting ‘uniform principles’ 
(Article 207 TFEU) and define agreed PGs like 'progressive abolition of restrictions on international 
trade and on foreign investments' (Article 206 TFEU) in the context of the EU’s common commercial 
policy, or ‘reduction and … eradication of poverty’ as ‘primary objective’ of the EU’s development 
cooperation policy (Article 208 TFEU). As international agreements concluded by the EU (e.g. the WTO 
Agreement) are approved by parliaments for the benefit of citizens in order to protect international PGs, 
political and academic claims - e.g. that ‘the EU’s external objectives lack a telos’ and ‘the EU’s external 
policy objectives are non-teleological, non-prioritised, open-ended, and concerned more with policy 
orientation than goal-setting’17 – are inconsistent with the text, context and declared objectives of EU 
constitutional law. The more the EU engages in ‘Hobbesian power politics’, the more even EU lawyers 
doubt whether its ‘cosmopolitan foreign policy constitution’ reflects 'unrealistic idealism'.18 Similarly, 
some political scientists argue that the EU has evolved into a 'civilian normative power' that is 
progressively transforming the 'Westphalian system' of 'international law among sovereign states' for 
the benefit of more than 500 million EU citizens cooperating in the common market and in a 
transnational rule of law system protecting human rights, democratic peace, a 'social market economy' 
and other PGs; yet, other observers describe the reality of the EU's external policies as 'power politics 
in disguise'.19  
Increasing dis-empowerment of EU citizens in the EU’s external relations and IDS? 
Empirical evidence suggests that inadequate protection of rule of law inside some EU member states 
(like Bulgaria, Greece and Romania), in some areas of EU integration (like the Euro-zone, illegal 
financial disbursements by EU institutions as annually documented by the EU Court of Auditors), and 
in some external EU policies (e.g. persistent disregard for some WTO legal obligations and for the 
‘Schengen rules’ regarding treatment of foreign immigrants and asylum seekers) undermines trust of 
EU citizens in the democratic legitimacy of EU law. Persistent EU violations of IDS rulings against the 
EU (e.g. in the GATT/WTO 'banana disputes' 1992-2012) and EU denial of effective judicial remedies 
of citizens reflect the prevailing 'political realism' advocated by EU politicians in order to limit their 
own accountability. This contribution has argued that - as such welfare-reducing treaty violations are 
neither 'necessary' nor 'proportionate' instruments for realizing legitimate EU policy objectives - citizens 
                                                     
17 Cf. M.Cremona, A Reticent Court? Policy Objectives and the Court of Justice, in: M.Cremona/ A.Thies (note 6), at 29, 31. 
18 Cf. B. de Witte, Too Much Constitutional Law in the EU's Foreign Relations? in: M.Cremona/B. de Witte (eds), EU Foreign 
Relations Law - Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart, 2008), at 3 ff.  
19 Cf. T.Forsberg, Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type, in: JCMS 49 (2011), at 
1183 ff; E.U.Petersmann, How to Evaluate the EU as a Normative Power in Multilevel Governance of Public Goods’? in: 
C.Kaddous (ed), The EU in International Organizations and Global Governance, Oxford: Hart 2015, 237-262. 
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and courts of justice must continue to challenge the widening gap between the ‘EU law in the books’ 
and EU legal practices so as to enhance the EU's 'democratic capabilities' to comply with the rule of law. 
‘Democratic capabilities’ depend on the ‘public reason’ prevailing in political institutions. Rights-based 
empowerment of citizens is not only a matter of justice and of promoting ‘republican virtues’ and 
‘democratic vigilance’ against abuses of governance powers. ‘Countervailing rights’ of adversely 
affected citizens are also the most efficient, decentralized instrument for counteracting rule violations 
which EU institutions ignore. Constitutional rules cannot become effective unless they are transformed 
into democratic legislation, effective administration and judicial protection of individual rights of 
citizens. Just as persistent violations of the budget and debt disciplines in Article 126 TFEU undermined 
the EU's 'monetary constitution' and persistent violations of the ‘Schengen procedures’ continue to erode 
the EU’s ‘area of freedom, security and justice’, so undermine persistent EU violations of IDS 
obligations (notably under WTO law) the 'foreign policy constitution' of the EU and, thereby, also the 
related international PGs (e.g. a non-discriminatory world trading, legal and dispute settlement system 
protecting individual access to justice and compliance with WTO law).  
The extension of ‘EU power politics’ (i.e. top-down restrictions of equal freedoms of citizens without 
constitutional justification and without effective judicial remedies) to the dispute settlement systems of 
UN agreements (e.g. the Law of the Sea Convention, the International Air Transport Agreement) and to 
newly negotiated FTAs reveals a ‘systemic disregard for EU citizens’. For instance, after 5 years of 
secretive FTA negotiations with Canada, EU citizens could discover on page 470 of this 
‘Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement’ (CETA) published on 26 September 2014 that, 
according to Article 14.16, ‘nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as conferring rights … on 
persons other than those created between the Parties under public international law, nor as permitting 
this Agreement to be directly invoked in the domestic legal systems of the Parties.’ Such ‘anti-citizen 
clauses’ – to be included also into the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the 
USA - deny citizens any effective legal and judicial remedies in domestic courts against treaty violations 
adversely affecting citizens. Judicial challenges of illegal import restrictions – which enabled citizens 
to protect transnational rule of law inside the EU and the EEA – will be excluded in CETA and TTIP, 
notwithstanding the rights of citizens ‘to an effective remedy and to a fair trial’ as protected in Article 
47 EUCFR. The intention by the EU Commission to afford only foreign investors ‘judicial privileges’ 
in the form of investor-state arbitration or alternative, international investment tribunals illustrates the 
risks of ‘negative discrimination’ of EU citizens and of ‘re-feudalization’ of the EU’s commercial and 
investment policies, thereby undermining transnational rule of law and judicial remedies for adversely 
affected EU citizens. As CETA regulates also specific product, production and consumer protection 
standards, the lack of effective judicial accountability and remedies risks to distort trade and competition 
and harm important consumer interests. 
In response to questions of why, since 2006, EU FTAs exclude private rights of citizens and ‘direct 
applicability’ of FTA provisions, EU trade diplomats admit their self-interest in following the power-
oriented trade policy traditions of third states so as to avoid legal, judicial and democratic accountability 
of EU trade diplomats vis-à-vis EU citizens.20 Yet, such EU power politics is inconsistent with Articles 
2, 3 and 21 TEU and with the ‘principal-agent-relationship’ underlying EU constitutional law aimed at 
protecting rights of citizens, including their modern entitlement ‘to a social and international order in 
which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized’ (Article 28 of the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights = UDHR). References to foreign power politics by the EU’s 
trading partners (e.g. the USA) do not justify denying constitutional rights of EU citizens in the different 
context of multilevel EU governance of PGs. In contrast to the EU’s trading partners outside Europe, 
national Constitutions in EU member states are increasingly transformed into ‘cosmopolitan 
Constitutions’ recognizing and protecting transnational rights of citizens and of democratic parliaments 
                                                     
20 Cf. E.U.Petersmann, Transformative Transatlantic Free Trade Agreements without Rights and Remedies of Citizens? in: 
JIEL 18 (2015), 579 ff. 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann 
10 
in their transnational cooperation in European integration.21 The functionally limited, multilevel foreign 
policy constitution of the EU - as an international organization with limited powers - differs from that 
of foreign countries in three important ways: 
 The external relations powers of the EU are constitutionally restrained to collective supply of 
enumerated PGs (e.g. in Articles 2, 3 and 21 TEU). While ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ and 
monarchical governance remain possible inside nation states (like the UK), the EU is functionally 
limited to ‘multilevel, republican governance’ for the benefit of EU citizens as ‘democratic 
principals’ also in external EU relations.  
 EU law rightly recognizes that collective supply of international PGs (e.g. those listed in Article 
21 TEU) protecting the equal rights of EU citizens depends on ‘strict observance of international 
law’ and EU participation in international agreements that ‘are binding upon the institutions of the 
Union and on its Member States’ (Article 216 TFEU). 
 The EU is constitutionally committed – also in the exercise of its foreign relations powers and in 
IDS – to ‘the protection of its citizens’ and ‘protection of human rights’ (Article 3 TEU); this 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism reflects Europe's long-standing, constitutional experience that 
collective protection of PGs depends on republican rights of citizens to hold government agents 
legally, democratically and judicially accountable.22        
From international to multilevel dispute settlement in the EU’s external relations law?  
Sections I and II concluded that the cosmopolitan functions of EU external relations law and its 
constitutional limitation to ‘strict observance of international law’ (Article 3 TEU) require limiting path-
dependent, state-centered IDS conceptions by multilevel, person-oriented dispute settlement protecting 
the constitutional rights of EU citizens. In citizen-driven areas of transnational economic, democratic 
and civil society cooperation, the EU’s subsidiarity requirement – i.e. ‘to ensure that decisions are taken 
as closely as possible to the citizens of the Union’ (cf. Article 1 and the TEU Protocol on the Application 
of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality) – reflects the historical lessons from centuries of 
civil society struggles for republican constitutionalism, i.e. that multilevel judicial cooperation in human 
rights, commercial, common market and criminal law adjudication can protect equal rights of citizens, 
judicial remedies and transnational rule of law more effectively across national frontiers than 
intergovernmental power politics. The customary law requirement to interpret treaties, and settle related 
disputes, ‘in conformity with the principles of justice and international law’, including also ‘human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all’ (cf. Preamble and Article 31:3 VCLT), requires interpreting 
the foreign relations law of the EU consistently with the fact that ‘human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all’ (e.g. individual access to justice), rule of law, democratic governance and ‘consistent 
interpretation’ requirements have become integral principles of national, EU and UN legal obligations 
of EU member states; even if third UN/WTO member states do not effectively protect such 'principles 
of justice' inside their domestic legal systems, the EU’s unique multilevel constitutionalism requires 
‘strict observance of international law’ for the benefit of EU citizens. Articles 3, 21 TEU call on EU 
institutions to exercise leadership for mutually coherent, multilevel 'rule of law policies', including EU 
respect for the GATT/WTO legal requirements of multilevel, legal and judicial protection of economic 
freedoms, non-discrimination, rule of law and access to justice at both international and national levels 
                                                     
21 For a survey see: J. Larik, Worldly Ambitions. Foreign Policy Objectives in European Constitutional Law, Florence: EUI 
doctoral thesis 2013, chapter II; A.Somek, The Cosmopolitan Constitution, OUP 2014. 
22 On the diverse legal traditions of republicanism and of its core values – such as liberty (non-domination), republican virtues 
of active citizenry finding self-realization in political participation and collective supply of PGs, communitarianism, 
political equality, deliberative democracy - see: S.Besson/J.Luis Marti (eds), Legal Republicanism: National and 
International Perspectives, OUP 2009.  
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of governance.23 As national and EU parliaments ratify UN and WTO agreements as representatives of 
EU citizens entitled to rules-based, democratic protection of PGs, the coherence- and ‘consistent 
interpretation’-requirements of national, EU and also UN/WTO legal systems should be construed in 
the EU external relations law for the benefit of EU citizens, for instance as empowering and protecting 
EU citizens in their ‘cosmopolitan roles’ as producers, workers, investors, traders and consumers 
cooperating in the global division of labor and benefitting from non-discriminatory conditions of 
competition promoting consumer welfare. For the reasons explained by the CJEU (e.g. in the Kupferberg 
and Kadi-cases), EU compliance with welfare-increasing trade and human rights obligations protecting 
equal freedoms as ‘first principle of justice’ should not be made conditional on whether third countries 
offer the same judicial remedies inside third countries. Such judicial protection of domestic citizens does 
not affect the EU powers under international law (e.g. WTO law) to suspend treaty obligations in 
response to treaty violations by third states.24 
Need for person- rather than state-centered ‘proportionality balancing’ in IDS 
The universal recognition of human rights and ‘democratic constitutionalism’ prompt ever more national 
and international courts to limit ‘power-oriented conceptions’ of ‘international law among states’ by 
person-oriented ‘proportionality balancing’ protecting rights of citizens. Examples include, inter alia: 
 the ICJ jurisprudence on interpreting Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
as conferring on individuals the right to receive consular assistance and justifying legally binding 
‘provisional measures’ by the ICJ in order to protect human rights pending the ICJ decision on the 
merits;25 
 the annulment of investment arbitral awards interpreting treaty provisions on ‘necessity’ in the 
light of the restrictive customary rules on state responsibility by ICSID annulment committees on 
the ground that ‘proportionality balancing’ - as a ‘general principle of law’ - offers a more 
appropriate legal methodology for balancing all public and private interests involved on the basis 
of ‘suitability’, ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality stricto sensu’, as practiced by ever more national 
and international courts throughout the world;26 
 the WTO jurisprudence balancing rights of governments with rights of exporters to ‘fair price 
comparisons’ in the calculation of antidumping duties27 and, more generally, to ‘basic fairness and 
due process’ in the administration of trade regulations;28 and 
 the jurisprudence of regional economic and human rights courts (like the CJEU, the EFTA Court, 
the European Court of Human Rights) reviewing economic restrictions in the light of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms of adversely affected citizens.29    
                                                     
23 Cf. Petersmann (note 2), at 194 ff, 233 ff. The recent CJEU judgment in Case C-21/14 (note 5 above) confirmed that the 
‘Fediol’- and ‘Nakajima’-exceptions of applying precise and unconditional WTO obligations - provided the EU legislator 
has specifically transformed them into EU law or ordered their internal applicability - continue to be construed very 
restrictively by EU courts. Most European lawyers ignore the multilevel nature of the WTO dispute settlement system and 
the customary law requirement of interpreting treaties ‘in conformity with principles of justice’. 
24 Cf. Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 of 15 May 2014 concerning the exercise of the Union’s rights for the application and 
enforcement of international trade rules, OJEU L 189/50 of 27 June 2014. 
25 Cf., e.g. LaGrand, Germany v USA, Judgment of 27 June 2001, ICJ Reports 2001, at 466 ff. 
26 Cf. A.Stone Sweet/G. della Cananea, Proportionality, General Principles of Law, and Investor-State Arbitration : A Response 
to José Alvarez, in : New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 46 (2014), 911-954. 
27 On the ‘zeroing jurisprudence’ of the WTO Appellate Body see: WT/DS294/AB/R, adopted on 9 May 2006; 
WT/DS322/AB/R, adopted 23 January 2007. 
28 US-Shrimps, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted on 6 November 1998. 
29 See the overview of case-law in: E.U.Petersmann, International Economic Law in the 21st Century. Constitutional Pluralism 
and Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods, Oxford: Hart 2012, chapter VIII.   
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The increasing cooperation between national and international courts – for instance, in the context of 
preliminary ruling procedures (e.g. in the EU), preliminary advisory opinion procedures (e.g. in the EEA 
and MERCOSUR), recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, related judicial dialogues, comity 
and judicial restraint – responds to this need for protecting individual rights in IDS by judicial 
‘balancing’ of state-centered and person-centered interpretations of multilevel regulation of PGs with 
due regard to the constitutional requirement of interpreting treaties and settling related disputes ‘in 
conformity with the principles of justice’, including ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.’ 
Even if citizens and governments often disagree on how to define procedural and substantive ‘principles 
of justice’, independent and impartial courts of justice – as exemplars of transparent and principle-
oriented ‘public reasoning’ – must promote ‘public reason’ by reviewing power-oriented 
‘intergovernmentalism’ and majority politics, including through ‘judicial dialogues’ and justification of 
judgments vis-à-vis citizens in terms of ‘principles of justice’ explaining the impact of human rights on 
multilevel governance of international PGs and related IDS.   
Promoting 'republican compliance communities' through 'cosmopolitan constitutionalism' 
Perhaps the most important political and legal lessons from the 2500 years of civil society struggles 
since the ancient Athenian democracy and Roman republic remains that democratic participation in 
‘republican constitutionalism’ promotes not only the ‘input-legitimacy’ of the ‘law in the books’, but 
also the ‘output-legitimacy’ and effectiveness of the ‘law in action’ and protection of PGs. Also in 
international commercial, trade and investment law, criminal and maritime law, HRL and intellectual 
property law and adjudication, the increasing number of international courts and of their case-load30 
were responses to demands from civil society and related ‘legal communities’ for limiting ‘governance 
failures’ through international courts, whose protection of legal remedies of citizens enhanced 
transnational rule of law and other ‘principles of justice’. Empowering citizens to participate in 
transnational supply of ‘aggregate PGs’ (e.g. as producers, traders, investors, consumers, Internet users, 
human rights and regional integration advocates) and to enforce their private and public rights (e.g. 
citizenship rights to participate in the election and work of national and regional parliaments, individual 
access to international courts of justice) has proven to be the most important driving-force for 
‘constitutionalizing’ legal systems by transforming constitutional and legislative rules and principles 
into multilevel administrative and judicial cooperation (e.g. among national courts, the CJEU, the EFTA 
Court, the ECtHR and transnational arbitration) and collective protection of transnational PGs.31 As 
violations of the law create adverse ‘externalities’, countervailing rights and judicial remedies of 
adversely affected citizens tend to be the most efficient legal methods for preventing and ‘internalizing’ 
such adverse effects, promoting legal accountability and ‘republican values’ like rule of law protecting 
equal freedoms of citizens. Linking IDS in the external relations of the EU to regional and domestic 
legal and judicial remedies of citizens is – as rightly prescribed in Article 3 TEU – the most effective 
constitutional approach to protecting rule of law in multilevel governance of PGs. By invoking their 
                                                     
30 Cf. G.De Baere/J.Wouters (eds), The Contribution of International  and Supranational Courts to the Rule of Law, 
Cheltenham: Elgar 2015; K.Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: International Courts in International Politics, 
Princeton UP 2013.    
31 On the increasing recognition of transnational economic, labour, social and political citizenship rights (e.g. in the EU, the 
EEA, the Andean Community, MERCOSUR, the Central American Common Market, the Economic Community of West-
African States, the Gulf Cooperation Council) and of regional parliamentary institutions see: C.Closa/D.Vintila, 
Supranational citizenship: rights in regional integration organizations (unpublished conference paper, EUI Florence 
2015). EU citizenship, free movement of persons beyond state borders (e.g. due to liberalization of services), multilevel 
parliamentarianism, and recognition of transnational rights of migrants (e.g. to take up employment and receive social 
security benefits while residing in another common market member country) are no longer ‘unique European experiments’ 
in rights-based integration law. Their ‘enabling’, ‘legitimating’, ‘enforcement’ and ‘republican functions’ (e.g. as 
decentralized means for limiting implementation deficits of PGs regimes) are increasingly recognized in African, Latin 
American and Central American integration regimes. 
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rights of ‘access to justice’32, to justification of governmental restrictions of equal freedoms33, and to 
mutually consistent interpretation and multilevel protection of ‘PGs agreements’ ratified by parliaments, 
citizens and courts of justice can limit majoritarian power politics and engage in impartial and 
independent judicial dialogues about how to protect transnational PGs in multilevel governance of PGs. 
Conclusion: the EU’s ‘cosmopolitan foreign policy constitution’ requires ‘protection of 
its citizens’ in IDS 
In its Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR, the CJEU emphasized the need for protecting 'the 
autonomy of EU law in the interpretation and application of fundamental rights': 'fundamental rights, as 
recognized in particular in the Charter, must be interpreted and applied within the EU in accordance 
with the constitutional framework' of EU law.34 This contribution has argued that the EU’s rights-based 
‘foreign policy constitution’ also requires autonomous ‘protection of its citizens’ (Article 3 TEU) 
through interpreting IDS in multilevel governance of transnational ‘aggregate PGs’ as protecting 
individual rights in conformity with the multilevel guarantees of individual ‘access to justice’ in EU 
law, WTO law and UN law even if third states do not reciprocate due to state-centered conceptions of 
IDS. As discussed in section III, courts of justice increasingly acknowledge that the universal 
recognition of human rights, constitutionalism (e.g. ‘proportionality principles’) and duties to protect 
international PGs justify ‘constitutional interpretations’ of treaty rules as protecting also rights of 
citizens in IDS:  
‘the fact that certain provisions of the Treaty are formally addressed to the Member States 
does not prevent rights from being conferred at the same time on any individual who has an 
interest in compliance with the obligations thus laid down.35 
Just as collective protection of transnational PGs inside the EU has depended on multilevel judicial 
protection of rule of law and fundamental rights of citizens, the transformation of ever more national 
and regional PGs into global ‘aggregate PGs’ (like a rules-based, liberal world trading system) requires 
extending ‘republican’ and ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’ to multilevel governance of PGs, including 
judicial protection of transnational rule of law and of constitutional rights of citizens through IDS. The 
EU’s ‘cosmopolitan foreign policy constitution’ recognizes these constitutional needs, yet without 
preventing EU politicians and government executives to pursue rational self-interests in limiting their 
legal, democratic and judicial accountability vis-à-vis citizens in the foreign policy area. Also EU 
lawyers and courts of justice unduly neglect the customary law requirement of limiting state-centered 
‘principles of justice’ by protection of constitutional and cosmopolitan rights of citizens in mutually 
beneficial, international cooperation.36 The more international PGs and related rights of citizens can be 
protected only through international agreements ‘binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its 
Member States’ (Article 216 TFEU), the stronger becomes the need for limiting ‘collective action 
problems’ by corresponding rights of citizens to judicial protection of transnational rule of law in 
conformity with ‘PGs treaties’ approved by parliaments in order to extend principles of equal freedoms, 
                                                     
32 Cf. R. Forst, The Right to Justification. Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice, New York: Columbia UP, 2012; A.A. 
Cançado Trindade, The Access of Individuals to International Justice, OUP 2011. 
33 See Article 52 EUCFR and, similarly, Article 29:2 UDHR: ‘In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the 
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a 
democratic society’.  
34 Opinion 2/13 of the Court of 18 December 2014, paras. 177-178. 
35 Cf. Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455, par. 31; Case C-281/98, Angonese [2000] ECR I-4139.  
36 Cf. note 2 and, e.g., H.Ruiz Fabri, Is There a Case – Legally and Politically – for Direct Effect of WTO Obligations? in: 
New York: Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/2014 (discussing ‘direct effect’ of WTO rules without regard to EU law, the 
WTO guarantees of individual access to justice and the customary rules of treaty interpretation). 
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non-discrimination and judicial protection of rule of law to mutually beneficial, transnational 
cooperation among citizens (like the WTO Agreement protecting a rules-based global division of labor). 
Article 21 TEU and other external relations provisions acknowledge that collective supply of global 
‘aggregate PGs’ depends on multilevel respect for ‘intermediate PGs’ like ‘democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and the principles of international law’ (Articles 2, 21 TEU) in order to coherently protect 
the EU’s ‘values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity’ (Article 21). These values 
include multilevel legal and judicial protection of cosmopolitan rights of EU citizens, as recognized in 
the individual ‘freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union law’ (Article 16 EUCFR) and 
everyone’s ‘right to an effective remedy’ (Article 47 EUCFR). Hence - similar to the multilevel, legal 
and judicial protection of ‘market freedoms’ inside federal states and for the benefit of ‘market citizens’ 
inside the EU and EEA -, HRL and EU law require protecting EU citizens and their cosmopolitan rights 
also in multilevel governance of  ‘aggregate PGs’ beyond Europe.37  
Apologetic ‘Hobbesian claims’ – e.g. that authoritarian top-down governance is justified by the 
incapacity of human beings to maintain peaceful, democratic order (homo homini lupus est), like claims 
by ‘radical puralists’ that ‘law is incapable of providing convincing justifications to the solution of 
normative problems’38 – are inconsistent with EU law and HRL, both of which have refuted 
Koskenniemi’s assertion that ‘no coherent normative practice arises from the assumptions on which we 
identify international law’.39 The ‘new strategy’ advocated by EU trade commissioner Malmström in 
response to the EU citizen protests against the secretive TTIP negotiations confirms, once again, that 
struggles for justice by EU citizens may contribute to transforming an ‘international community of 
states’ (Article 53 VCLT) into a cosmopolitan community of citizens, peoples and democratic 
governments respecting their legal duties to 'uphold and promote' the EU's internal values and 'contribute 
to the protection of its citizens' (Article 3:5 TEU) also in multilevel governance of global PGs. European 
integration law reflects the unique experience that democratic protection of national and European PGs 
was most successful if it combined constitutional, representative, participatory and deliberative 
democracy in ways holding legislative, administrative and judicial government institutions 
democratically, legally and judicially accountable vis-à-vis citizens as ‘agents of justice’ and democratic 
holders of ‘constituent powers’. Also UN institutions now acknowledge that human rights must be part 
of the rule of law inside and among UN member states so that all persons and multilevel governance 
institutions are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated.40 UN, WTO and EU diplomats justifying their ‘disconnected intergovernmentalism’ by the 
need to treat citizens as mere objects of international law should read the ‘French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen’ of 1789, as subsequently confirmed by the Constitutions of the 4th and 
5th French Republics: ‘ignorance, forgetfulness, or contempt of human rights are the sole causes of 
public misfortune and government depravity’ (Preamble); ‘statute law is entitled to forbid only actions 
harmful to society’ (section 5). In order to enable citizens to defend their reasonable self-interests, 
                                                     
37 Cf. E.U.Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International Economic Law. International 
and Domestic Foreign Trade Law and Policy in the United States, the European Community and Switzerland (Fribourg 
UP/Boulder Publishers 1991); this book explained why the constitutional legitimacy of multilevel guarantees of equal 
freedoms, non-discrimination, rule of law and access to justice in national, regional and worldwide economic law was 
enhanced by their mutually consistent protection as rights of citizens. Connecting multilevel legal principles by 
acknowledging their complementary ‘constitutional functions’ (or what Anne Peters calls ‘compensatory 
constitutionalism’) – e.g. for protecting equal freedoms and transnational rule of law – can transform the 'disconnected 
UN/WTO governance' without preventing legitimately diverse ‘constitutional interpretations’ at national levels (e.g. due 
to the reality that German and EU constitutional law protects ‘equal freedoms’ more comprehensively than ‘common law 
freedoms’ in Anglo-Saxon democracies based on ‘parliamentary sovereignty’). 
38 Cf. M.Koskenniemi, From Apologia to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (CUP 2005), at 69.  
39 Koskenniemi (note 38). 
40 Cf. the UN General Assembly Resolution on ‘The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels’ (A/RES/67/97, 
2012), and the report by the UN Secretary-General on ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies’ (UN Doc. S/2004/616). 
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multilevel dispute settlement systems (e.g. in UN, WTO and free trade agreements of the EU) must be 
legally presumed to protect equal rights and ‘access to justice’ for the benefit of EU citizens at all levels 
of multilevel governance so that EU citizens can hold multilevel governance institutions legally, 
democratically and judicially more accountable and protect their cosmopolitan rights, transnational rule 
of law and other PGs more effectively. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
